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Abstract
This paper proposes a novel method to recover the markets beliefs about the Feds monetary
policy by using the responses of interest rates to economic news. We investigate the di¤erential
impact of news over time showing that the impact of this information is time varying, and
that the importance of the housing and labor markets has sharply increased after the crisis.
We follow a di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation procedure to test for the presence of political
constraints in the U.S., employing as control group the response of the European swap rates to
macroeconomic announcements. We provide strong evidence that after the crisis of 2007, the
Federal Reserve has been subject to the political pressure exerted by the Congress.
JEL Classication: G14, G18, E43, E58
Keywords: political pressure, Fed, interest rates, nancial crisis.
1 Introduction
Stressful economic times almost invariably fuel political support for inationary policies. The
current nancial crisis is no exception, and the Federal Reserve is under intensifying attack in
Congress. One proposal would subject the monetary policy decisions of the Fed to congressional
scrutiny, while another would make the presidents of the 12 semi-autonomous regional reserve banks
more politically accountable. The current administration has proposed expanding its regulatory
oversight to contain future crises, while the treasury secretary has proposed to strip the central bank
of its consumer-protection duties. Although just one senator voted against Bernankes conrmation
in 2006, between 15 and 30 senators from both parties may vote to do so by the end of January 20101 .
On the other hand, the Fed is trying at the same time to unwind its unconventional stimulus and to
avoid attracting too much attention from the market. On Christmas Eve of 2009, for example, the
Fed announced that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were able to buy mortgages without any caps.
1See for example the newspaper articles "Policy punchbags", Jan 14, 2010, and "This way out", Jan 4, 2009 (The
Economist).
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The choice to announce that decision on Christmas Eve allowed the Fed to avoid the opposition of
Congress and the overreaction of the market.
This is not the rst time that the Fed is under political pressure by the Congress. One well-
known example of political pressure is the instance when President Johnson took Federal Reserve
Chairman Martin "out to the woodshed" in December 1965, shortly after the Federal Reserve Board
approved an increase in the discount rate. Transcripts of President Nixons o¢ ce recordings have
revealed the pressures faced by Chairman Burns in the early 1970s.
A variety of documents have underscored the political pressures on the Federal Reserve during
the early years of the Carter Administration2 . Recently, Levin and Taylor (2009) identied political
constraints as the main causes of the Great Ination. The conduct of monetary policy became rela-
tively well insulated from political pressures after the Great Ination3 . The clarication of Federal
Reserve accountability that came with the introduction of regular policy reports and testimony
under the "Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act" (1978) likely helped defuse some of the
political pressures on the Federal Reserve. In the early 1980s, President Reagan voiced consistently
strong support for Chairman Volckers policies, thereby initiating a pattern of acknowledging the
Feds operational independence that was generally followed by subsequent administrations.
This paper addresses the following question: beyond the anecdotal evidence, is the FED under
political pressure? We do not participate in the current debate over the benets of having an
independent central bank; we rather want to understand whether the market reaction during the
crisis has been consistent with the idea that the Fed is more amenable to the politiciansrequests
now than in the past.
In principle, one could try to address this question directly by analyzing data about the speeches,
statements, and hearings of the House Financial Services Committee or, as in the previous literature,
employing data on politiciansspeeches in the Wall Street Journal. However, direct measures are
problematic in part because of timing; while a congressman might propose a bill to reduce Feds
independence, it is rarely unanticipated, and news leaks pose a real problem. Therefore, it would
be very di¢ cult to identify the Feds reactions to these pressures. We follow a di¤erent approach.
We aim to identify the existence of political constraints on the Fed as perceived by the market.
That is, market participants will respond di¤erently to certain economic news depending on whether
they believe that the Fed is politically constrained to support the housing market with low mortgage
rates and the labor markets with inationary monetary policy. The reaction of the yield curve to
economic news is then a good proxy for the market participants beliefs about the Feds future
decisions. We start by analyzing the response of the term structure of interest rates to a set of
macro announcements and we nd evidence that few of them are relevant to explaining the daily
2See for example Weise (2008), Meltzer (2010) and Biven (2002).
3The Great Ination from 1965 to 1984 is the climactic monetary event of the last part of the 20th century. The
annual reported rate of consumer price increase rose from 1.07 percent in January 1965 to 13.70 percent in March
1980 before declining in 1983.
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change in the rates of di¤erent maturities.
We then try to isolate the e¤ects of news about the housing and the labor markets on the interest
rates. If it is true that such political pressure has been exerted by the congress after the beginning
of the crisis, then such news must have di¤erent impacts on the markets before and during the
crisis. While the existing literature4 presents evidence that few macro announcements, like non
farm payroll, have signicant e¤ects on the yield curve, we provide evidence that during the crisis,
many more economic releases are under the scrutiny of market participants. We nd that mortgage
applications, the federal decit, the Case-Shiller index and the auction announcement together with
the unemployment rate are the most signicant.
This is consistent with the political pressure hypothesis that the market expects the Fed to
react to these announcements more strongly during the crisis than before the crisis. That is, these
e¤ects, which were never investigated in the previous literature, suggest that the interest rates will
be more responsive to politiciansrequests to support the households of their constituents.
Because the Fed has injected a record amount of liquidity into the nancial markets in the last
two years, we collect data about treasury auctions and analyze the impact of these announcements
on the yield curve, nding a signicant supply e¤ect. That is, we consider the variation in the ratio
between the sum of bids accepted and the sum of bids o¤ered nding that it signicantly a¤ects
the daily variation in treasury rates.
We then turn to the time varying e¤ect of these announcements on the term structure of interest
rates. This is the rst attempt to analyze the di¤erential impact of economic news on the yield curve
over time. We nd strong and signicant evidence that releases of information about the housing
and the labor markets became more signicant after August 2007. Although it is not surprising,
it suggests a deeper analysis than the one presented in the existing event study literature. In fact,
we di¤erentiate between the surprises and analyze the response to good and bad news about each
gure, nding a signicant asymmetry between good and bad news. One question remains to be
answered, why are these e¤ects more signicant now?
Up to now, the evidence is not su¢ cient to disentangle the presumed e¤ect of political pressure
had on the Fed from the fragility hypothesis. That is, certain economic gures became relevant only
during the crisis because they then reached a critical level at which the Fed has to react.
In order to disentangle the political pressure hypothesis completely from the fragility hypothesis,
we follow a di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation procedure. We collect data about the Euro interest
rates and economic announcements in the Euro area and try to estimate the response to the latter.
The Euro zone is a valid control group; in fact, the European Central Bank (ECB) is not as easily
subject to political pressure as the Federal Reserve, given the low relative power of each member
of the European Union. Moreover, the Euro zone has experienced the same economic slow down
as in the U.S.; the unemployment rate has reached almost 10% of the labor force, exactly the
4The next section is dedicated to a review of the existing literature.
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same as the record reached in the U.S., so in absence of any political pressure the market should
believe that the ECB will react in the same way to economic news related to housing and labor
markets as the FED. The di¤erential response, if any, is evidence in favor of the political pressure
hypothesis. We nd that this di¤erential e¤ect is statistically and economically signicant. It
remains signicant even after controlling for di¤erences between the U.S. and the Euro zone prior
to any political pressure attempt and for aggregate factors that would cause changes in the interest
rate responses even in the absence of political pressure on the Fed. Furthermore, we provide a
number of di¤erent specications, which test the robustness of our ndings and show that this
increased political pressure on the Fed in the post-crisis period is not an artifact of the media but
an economically signicant e¤ect.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing literature on related
topics. Section 3 presents our data, hypothesis and methodology. Section 4 presents preliminary
results while the discussion of the main empirical ndings is presented in Section 5. In Section 6
we present some extensions to check the robustness of our results and gain some new insights. The
paper closes with conclusions and ideas for further research in Section 7.
2 Related Literature
This paper bridges several di¤erent strands of the economics and nancial literature.
First, it is related to the growing literature related to the e¤ect of economic news on the yield
curve. This literature analyzes the signed price impact of non-anticipated information, and mainly
investigates which types of announcements signicantly a¤ect the interest rates. Early studies
focused on a selected number of macroeconomic gures and on selected points of the yield curve.
Grossman (1981) and Urich and Watchel (1988) analyze the impact of money supply; Hardouvelis
(1988), Prag (1994) and Edison (1996) analyze the e¤ect of surprises about the labor market along
with Consumer Price Index and Producer Price Index. More recently, Fleming and Remolona
(1997, 2001), Balduzzi et al. (2001) and Guegan and Ielpo (2008) employ intraday data and a
broader range of economic gures. They investigate the time necessary for nancial markets to
incorporate the news on asset prices. Because we are interested in the time-varying di¤erential
e¤ect of economic gures on the whole yield curve, we employ daily data because intraday data
would be hard to manage for such a long interval and would contain much more noise than daily
data. Moreover, the signicance of our e¤ects is even more striking given our focus on the daily
variations of the interest rates, with respect to the response in a window of a few minutes.
In its attempt to investigate the e¤ect of auction announcements on the yield curve, this paper is
also related to the literature on treasury auctions built on the seminal paper by Cammack (1997),
which studies treasury auctions and shows that imperfect information is present in the treasury
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bill market. In 2008 and 2009 the treasury has issued a record amount of debt, and the Fed has
scheduled an average of sixteen auctions a month for the year 2010. It is thus reasonable to think
that the market will react more strongly to the announcement of these new auctions than in the
past. We provide evidence to support this hypothesis.
It is also related to the macro-nance literature on the factors that may explain the dynamics of
the yield curve. On the one hand, empirical macroeconomic research has investigated whether and
how government decits and other macro related factors may a¤ect interest rates. Ang and Piazzesi
(2003) and Bernanke and Bovin (2003) are examples of this strand of the literature. On the other
hand, the importance of principal component analysis in explaining and forecasting the movements
of the yield curve has been recognized since the seminal paper by Litterman and Scheinkman
(1991). We follow Diebold and Li (2006) in distilling the entire yield curve into a three-dimensional
parameter that evolves dynamically.
Moreover, recent research in nance has led to a better understanding of the dynamic properties
of the term structure of interest rates. The models are parsimonious, nancially coherent, and able
to capture some important stylized facts. Most of these bond pricing models, however, are based
on unobserved risk factors that are not easy to interpret. In this literature, Diebold, Piazzesi
and Rudebusch (2005) and Christensen, Diebold and Rudenbusch (2009) aim to draw explicit
connections between the latent risk factors that drive the dynamics of the term structure and
the observable macroeconomic variables that characterize the state of the economy. Interestingly,
Dewachter and Lyrio (2006) nd that each latent factor has a macroeconomic source. The level
e¤ect can be linked to lung-run ination e¤ects the slope factor correlates well with the predictable
ination and the business cycle components, and the curvature e¤ect is related to the current stance
of monetary policy, i.e., to real interest rate movements not related to the standard macroeconomic
conditions. This conrms the strong relationship between macroeconomics and nance in this area
of research. Monch (2008) suggests the following interpretation: "Almost 80% of the variation in
the slope of the yield curve is explained by the macro factors. Both the business cycle related rst
and the ination-related second factor are positively linked with the slope of the yield curve. This
is consistent with the fact that short-term interest rates are expected to rise relative to long-term
interest rates in an inationary environment. Moreover, the short rate has a strongly signicant
negative coe¢ cient in the slope equation which is consistent with the intuition that rises in the
short rate lead to a decreasing yield curve slope".
Our paper improves on these results by showing that scal policy, housing and labor markets
factors may also have a signicant inuence on government bonds. In this respect, our work is
related to that of Dai and Philippon (2006), which argues that in order to price long term bonds
correctly it is important to take into account the scal position of the government, above and
beyond ination and real activity. This suggests that politicianschoices a¤ect the yield curve and
then the monetary policy, although the latter should in principle be established only by the Fed.
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Furthermore, it has been shown that the business cycle may also signicantly inuence the yield
curve; the paper of Ang and Bekaert (2002) is one of the rst attempts to model the term structure
by using regime-switching models. They show that interest rate regimes correspond reasonably
well with business cycles in the U.S. This suggests that interest rates respond signicantly to the
economics conditions. We qualify this nding by analyzing data before and after the nancial crisis
of 2007 and investigating whether the yield curve responds di¤erently to macro announcements
with respect to the past. That is, we are able to address the following questions: does a signicant
di¤erence exist in the impacts of economic news on the yield curve before and after the crisis? More
generally, did the crisis change the market participantsbeliefs about the Feds independence from
Congress?
In this respect our paper is related to Hamilton, Pruitt and Borger (2009) which proposes a
novel method for estimating a monetary policy rule using macroeconomic news. They estimate
directly the policy rule agents use to form their expectation linking how the forecasts of economic
conditions and monetary policy are a¤ected by news. We share with this study the same intuition,
that is, the possibility to recover the markets beliefs about monetary policy by using the responses
of interest rates to economic news. However, they focus on the period 1994-2007 trying to estimate
a Taylor Rule based policy function. Our main focus is on the di¤erential impact of news over time
and across di¤erent currency areas to identify the presence of political constraints to the Federal
Reserves monetary policy as perceived by market participants.
Finally, this paper is related to the political economy literature, which both empirically and
theoretically studies the independence of central bank authorities. The literature on the indepen-
dence of central authorities began with the paper by Bade and Parkin (1982), but Cukierman et al.
(1991) developed a widely used index of central bank independence. The papers on political cycles
by Alesina (1987), Persson and Tabellini (1990) and Alesina and Roubini (1992), among others, are
also relevant.
More recently, Havrilesky (1995) to examine to which extent politicians inuenced policies of the
Fed, he constructed an indicator for political pressure on the central bank by counting the number
of reports in the Wall Street Journal of politicians arguing in favor of more or less restrictive
monetary policy5 . We aim to identify, instead, whether the Congress has had any inuence on the
Fed, and whether it will have any inuence on the exit strategy from the unconventional stimulus,
by employing the market reactions to relevant economic surprises.
5Maier et al. (2002) employs this approach to investigate the political constraints on the Bundensbank, nding
that the Bundensbank did not respond to political pressure.
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3 Research Design
We now present our hypotheses, the methodology we use to test them, and the associated dataset.
We rst present in detail the hypotheses we investigate and then the model for the yield curve with
the economic intuition behind it. We then discuss how we address some known issues related to
the series. Finally, we describe the data employed to carry out our analysis.
3.1 Hypothesis
Economic theory suggests that the information and beliefs held by market participants ought to be
the key determinant of asset prices. Accordingly, the deviations of the realized gure for some key
economic indicator from the market consensus, should lead to a revision of the markets beliefs and
to a change in asset prices. Yet, several studies have documented that few macroeconomic releases
have an inuence in nancial markets. The existing literature has documented a signicant reaction
to non-farm payroll, price indexes and a few other economic activity indicators. Financial markets
also try to infer from employment gures whether inationary pressures are building up, which may
arise in a tighter labor market. Moreover, in 2009 the unemployment rate has registered a record
10%, which is the highest recorded since the 1980s. Therefore, the unemployment rate has recently
been more closely monitored. Note also that once recovery is entrenched and unemployment starts
falling, the Fed should raise interest rates and shrink the Feds balance sheet. However, this policy
is expected to draw attacks from the Congress. This means that the unemployment rate, as well
as other labor market gures, contains information not only about the current economic condition
and the expectations about ination, but the variation in the interest rates is also a proxy for the
markets beliefs about how fast the Fed will be able to unwind the stimulus package. At the same
time, the housing market indicators are relevant to understanding the movements of the yield curve
because the interest rates are also settled in response to the housing market conditions. Due to
the information content of the gures described above, one would expect surprises in any of these
gures to contribute to the explanation of changes in the yield curve after an announcement. This
is stated in hypothesis H1.
 H1: Impact of labor and housing market gures
Interest rates react signicantly to unanticipated information about the conditions of the
labor and housing markets.
The housing bubble has been recognized as one of the main factors contributing to the crisis.
The beginning of the crisis with the burst of this bubble led market participants to monitor the
housing market indexes closely. Ever since the rst few indicators, such as the Case-Shiller Index
and the existing home sales gures, began to suggest that the house prices were starting to fall for
the rst time in a decade, all the housing market gures have gained widespread attention from
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market participants. Moreover, the Feds attempt to sustain a regime with low mortgage rates
made these indicators even more informative of the Feds policy reactions during the crisis. The
deep economic recession led the unemployment rate to rise up to a record 10% in the end of 2009.
The Fed has reacted to this development by maintaining low interest rates. Due to the information
content of the gures described above, especially during the crisis, one would expect surprises in
these gures to have di¤erent impacts on the term structure of interest rates before and during the
crisis. Hypothesis H2 summarizes this argument.
 H2: The crisis has increased the impact of labor and housing market gures
Interest rates react more strongly to non-anticipated information about the labor and housing
markets after August 2007.
Since August 2007, the Fed has reacted to the lack of trust among nancial institutions by
supplying liquidity to the banking system. There have been an increasing number of treasury
auctions, and then the market started to absorb an increasing amount of treasury bonds, well
above the level that was standard in the past. One would therefore expect the market react
more signicantly to auction announcements during the crisis, as the supply of treasury bonds has
increased signicantly. Moreover, the possibility of a tail auction, that is, one in which the supply
exceeds demand, as occurred in October and December 2009, is an event that gains much attention
from market participants. However such reaction is not guaranteed; in fact, during recessions
market participants tend to buy more treasuries to hold more liquidity. The following hypothesis
states this formally.
 H3: The auction announcement e¤ect
Interest rates respond more strongly to the announcement of a new treasury auction during
the crisis than before, and their reactions also depend on the numbers of bids accepted by the
treasury.
It is well known in the nance literature6 that the market reacts di¤erently to unexpected good
and bad news. A series of good news about the housing market, such an increase in home prices or
in the number of mortgage application above the markets consensus forecasts, makes the release
of unexpectedly bad news about the housing market a particularly relevant event that may have a
greater impact on the interest rates. The same holds for the labor market. The recession caused
a sharp increase in the unemployment rate as well as in jobless claims, so a positive surprise may
have a di¤erent impact on the interest rates. Hypothesis H4 follows this line of reasoning.
 H4: Asymmetry in the reactions to good and bad news
6Examples of these market reactions may be traced in the literature on the e¤ects of earnings announcements
since Chambers and Penman (1984).
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Market participants react di¤erently to surprises that indicate worsening economic conditions
and to non-anticipated information that suggests an improvement of the economy.
Now we try to shed new light on the fundamental reasons underlying the di¤erent patterns in
the yield curve reactions to economic news mentioned above. If a di¤erential impact of surprises
about housing and labor markets on the interest rates over time exists, this may be for two di¤erent
reasons. On one hand, the Feds and the markets reaction to the news about the conditions of the
economy may well be cycle-dependent. Moreover, the markets reaction may be exacerbated by the
record levels reached by these market indexes. Hypothesis H5 suggests this "fragility e¤ect".
 H5: The fragility hypothesis
Interest rates react more strongly to news related to unemployment and housing market
because they have reached critical levels that require stronger interventions.
On the other hand, the time varying reactions of the term structure of interest rates to macro
surprises may signal that the market believes that the Feds policy reaction function is constrained
by the political pressure exerted by the Congress. That is, the overreaction to bad news about the
labor market or the housing market may be motivated by the fact that the market perceives the Fed
as being under pressure to maintain a low interest rate regime. The reaction to good news about
the economic news may reect the markets expectations that the Fed will not raise the interest
rates as promptly as it should in order to avoid an inationary wave. The markets presumption
that the Fed will be biased in its reactions to the economic news may explain the variations in the
interest rates (hypothesis H6).
 H6: The political pressure hypothesis
The stronger response of the interest rates to labor and housing market statistics is due to the
belief that the Congresss pressure on the Fed has conditioned and will inuence its monetary
policy.
3.2 Methodology
We propose to estimate a version of the model of Balduzzi et al. (2001), rened and augmented to
take in consideration the possibility of serially correlated errors and the di¤erent levels of volatility
of the interest rates over time.
Suppose that we observe J types of macroeconomics announcements. For each announcement
j = 1; :::; J; there is a consensus forecast given by the median of a survey of economists. Let Fi;t be
this forecast at time t for the announcement j and Gj;t be the realized announcement. We follow
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Balduzzi et al. (2001) and Guegan and Ielpo (2008) in dening the surprise j at time t as
Sj;t =
Gj;t   Fj;t
j
where j is the standard error of the economic surprises calculated over the whole sample. This
scaling procedure enables us to compare the results between surprises.
Surprises are used as explanatory factors for the daily variation of rates for a given maturity.
Let Rt; be the daily closing interest rate of maturity  on date t: Then, the linear model used in
the literature to estimate the e¤ects of economic news on the yield curve can be stated as follows:
Rt;  Rt 1; = a+
JX
j=1
j;1j;tSj;t + "t; (1)
where 1j;t is an indicator function equal to one if the surprise j is realized on date t; and zero if
not7 .
We improve this standard model in a number of di¤erent ways. First, we propose to add to this
model the factors fi;t; i = 1; 2; obtained from the principal component analysis (PCA) performed
on the rates. This is suggested by the existing and growing literature following the paper by
Litterman and Scheinkman (1991), which identies three common factors to explain bond returns.
Their nding, which was conrmed by the subsequent literature in xed income markets is that
three factors explain up to 98% of the variations in the interest rates. These factors are commonly
interpreted as the level, the slope and the curvature factors. Let R be the matrix of the daily
variations in interest rates for each of the US maturities available, i.e.
R = [Rt;  Rt 1; ] 8t; 
Let C be the covariance matrix associated with the series in R: Given that C meets the conditions
for the Spectral Theorem, it can be decomposed as
C = DD;
where  = diag (1; :::; p) is the ordered eigenvalue matrix, p is the rank of the matrix C; and D
is the matrix containing the associated eigenvectors. Recall that the PCA factors are fi = RDi;
where Di is the ith column of the matrix D: The vector of factors is fi = (fi;1; fi;2; :::; fi;n )
0 for a
sample of size n, where fi;t is the value at time t for the ith factor. The model presented in equation
7See Balduzzi et al. (2001) for the releasing time of each economic gure and for the list of contemporaneous
announcements.
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(1) can be augmented in the following way:
Rt;  Rt 1; = a+
JX
j=1
j;1j;tSj;t +
2X
i=1
ifi;t + "t; (2)
These two factors take into account the level and the slope of the yield curve8 . Although includ-
ing them in the regressions decreases the possibility to nd any signicant e¤ect of the economic
surprises, it allows us to identify new signicant e¤ects.
Second, because interest rates time series usually display a form of autoregressive variance, we
account for heteroskedasticity by allowing "t; to follow a GARCH (1,1) process. Our model can
be consistently estimated by Generalized Least Squares, thus taking into account non-spherical
innovations. By the Zellner theorem, this is equivalent to estimating these equations either simul-
taneously or maturity by maturity. We opt for the second approach because it is numerically easier
to implement. Moreover, to account for a time varying volatility, whenever allowed by data avail-
ability, we t (2) with a model of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) by using a
maximum likelihood estimator. In many of the regressions discussed below we also estimate a set
of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions, to take into account the fact that the errors in the regression
for the interest rate of maturity  are correlated with the errors of the regression for the rate of
maturity  0:
In the specications above, we have assumed that the response to economic news is invariant
over our sample. To identify some pattern in the e¤ects of economic announcements on interest
rates over time, we follow Almeida, Goodhart and Payne (1998), employing a di¤erent dummy
variable for each year in our sample, that is, from 1996 to 2009. These dummies are interacted with
the surprise series, giving for each announcement a di¤erent regressor for each year in the sample.
Hence, our analysis of time varying e¤ects of economic announcements starts in its simplest form
from the the following equation:
Rt;  Rt 1; = a+
13X
t=1
1t
0@ JX
j=1
j;1j;tSj;t
1A+ 2X
i=1
ifi;t + "t; ; (3)
where 1t are the yearly indicator variables. Because only the dummies from 2007 through 2009 turn
out to be signicant, we improve the e¢ ciency of our estimator by including a single dummy which
accounts for the post-crisis period. In some specications, we augment the model in equation (3)
allowing for Feds chairman xed e¤ects. Although our sample is restricted by data availability to
the 1996-2009 period, we add an indicator function to account for the di¤erent FED chairmen in
this period. This takes into account the fact that the two di¤erent chairmen may have had di¤erent
8The results are not sensitive to the inclusion of the curvature factor in the regressions.
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policy reaction functions that could interfere with the interpretation of the result of the coe¢ cients
over time. Moreover, we also include a daily dummy to take into account the possibility of a Friday
xed-e¤ect. Neither of the two is signicant, and then we omit them from the tables.
We estimate the model (2) employing di¤erent maturities. However, in trying to investigate
the e¤ects of selected economic surprises on the whole yield curve, we use as dependent variables
the rst and the second factors9 . In this way, we are able to identify whether a particular bit of
economic news is more likely to change the level of the interest rates or to change the slope of the
yield curve. To analyze the time-varying impacts, we make use of both a rolling regression and of
a di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimator across periods.
Finally, to analyze the evidence in support of the political pressure hypothesis against the
fragility hypothesis, we employ a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach, using Europe as the control
group. This procedure will be discussed in detail in Section 4.2.
3.3 Data
The U.S. rate dataset contains daily treasury and swap rates with maturities ranging from 1 to 30
years, which are used to compute the PCA factors. The Euro dataset contains only swap rates.
Our sample covers the period September 30, 1993 January 10, 2010, including each business day,
and is provided by Credit Suisse10 . Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the daily changes in
interest rates, for selected maturities.
[Insert Table 1, about here]
During a given trading day, the moments at which the intraday database is updated are rather
random, and this randomness extents to the values of the maturities that are being updated. On
the contrary, for the closing interest rates, the time of the update is rather homogeneous. This is
why we propose to use a daily dataset consisting of these closing interest rates. Notice that this
choice reduces the possibility of nding any signicant result; in fact, market participants react
immediately to the release of economic news, and although the response may be quite large, it may
disappear before the end of the day.
The economic calendar across the dates in question for the interest rates has been extracted
from Bloomberg. This calendar contains all the economic announcements linked to the U.S. and
Euro area economy that are supposed to be monitored by nancial market participants. Several of
these gures are well known to economists, such as the Non-Farm Payroll gure, i.e., the number
of jobs created in a one month period, as issued by the Bureau of Labor statistics. Other gures
are used by practitioners as indicators of the yield curve movements, such as Consumer Condence
9We are indebted to Steve Ross for having suggested this procedure.
10The main sources were Datastream, Bloomberg and Locus.
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or Philifed Index announcements, among other indicators.
Table 2 lists the announcements whose impact on the interest rate is investigated for both the
U.S. and Europe. In our methodology, we use the rst estimates of the macroeconomic news. Most
of the macroeconomic gures released in the US are initially preliminary estimates.
[Insert Table 2, about here]
On the next announcement for the same gure, a revised estimate of the preceding gure is released.
Most of the macroeconomics datasets used in empirical papers make use of the revised gures;
however, the market participants face and primarily react to the rst announcement. Therefore, for
our purposes, the use of the rst announcement is of tremendous importance. Recently, Bernanke
and Boivin (2001) and Kishor and Koenig (2005), among others, took this data revision problem
into consideration. The Bloomberg calendar also contains the Bloomberg forecasts regarding each
of these gures.
[Insert Table 3, about here]
Bloomberg forecasts are formed using the 50% empirical quantile of the distribution of a survey of
the forecasts of several economists regarding a precise gure. The use of the median as a measure
of the expectations makes the forecast robust to the attempts of self-serving economists who might
try to manipulate the forecast for their own prot. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on the
surprises for both U.S. and the Europe. We retain the last median computed by the Bloomberg
services. Bloomberg also provides the economic releases for Europe with the related economists
forecasts.
4 Preliminary Results
This section presents some new results on the impact of economic news on the term structure of
interest rates. Although these are of interest in and of themselves, suggesting the greater importance
of some values compared to others and highlighting their time variation e¤ects, they are also
functional to our analysis.
Table 4 presents the estimation results for the six available interest rates: one-year, two-year,
three-year, ve-year, ten-year and thirty-year maturities. The table shows the slope coe¢ cients,
standard errors and R2 estimates. Intercept terms are not reported because they are rarely signif-
icant.
[Insert Table 4, about here]
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For each maturity we estimate the model presented in 2 using Prais-Winsten regression and boot-
strapped standard errors. The rst column for each maturity presents the results including only the
rst factor, that is, controlling for the level of the interest rates. The second column also includes
the second factor as a regressor, in order to control for the steepness of the yield curve.
In summary, we nd that interest rates react signicantly to only a few economic gures. An-
nouncement about Mortgage Applications a¤ect the whole yield curve economically and statistically
signicantly, with the exception of the three-year interest rate. The e¤ect on the short end of the
yield curve is positive while the e¤ect on the long end is signicantly negative suggesting a atten-
ing of the yield curve as a response to an unanticipated release in mortgage applications. Another
announcement that has a signicant impact on the whole yield curve is ISM Non Manuf. Per-
sonal Consumption and Non-farm Payroll a¤ect only the ve-year notes, while CPI inuences the
two-year interest rate. One announcement, Retail Sales, only has an impact on the three-year notes.
The other economic announcements, even those that we would have expected to be relevant, do
not seem to have any e¤ects on the interest rates. Therefore, apart from Mortgage Applications,
we cannot provide evidence to support the rst hypothesis H1 on the importance of housing and
labor markets.
However, our regression has estimated the average e¤ect of these surprises over quite a long
sample period, possibly reducing the probability of nding a statistically signicant e¤ect. In order
to overcome this problem, we investigate whether there is a di¤erential e¤ect of some key economic
releases on the interest rates. As a rst step we estimate a rolling regression over the sample period
for the Mortgage Applications, Unemployment Rate and Durable Goods surprises.
[Insert Figure 1, about here]
Figure 1 shows the slope coe¢ cients of model (2) on the two-year and the thirty-year interest
rates. It clearly shows that while the e¤ect of Mortgage Applications on the two-year notes was
not signicantly di¤erent from zero before November 2007, it became statistically and economically
signicant at the beginning of 2008 with a coe¢ cient close to 0.6. The same pattern is found for
the e¤ect on the thirty-year bonds, with the only di¤erence being that starting in December 2007,
surprises about Mortgage Applications negatively a¤ected the long end of the yield curve. This
suggests that after the beginning of the crisis, with the rst negative surprises about the housing
market conditions, the market participants correctly anticipated a decrease in interest rates at
longer maturity.
[Insert Figure 2, about here]
Figure 2 shows the time varying slope coe¢ cient of the Unemployment Rate suprises on the two-
year interest rate. While it is not signicantly di¤erent from zero until the end of 2007, it becomes
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signicant later on, with a negative sign. This suggests that an increase in the unemployment rate
has triggered a reduction in interest rates during the crisis. Finally, Figure 3 shows that the same
pattern can be found analyzing the slope coe¢ cient of the Durable Goods Orders, which becomes
signicantly negative in 2007.
To explore this issue further, we regress interest rate changes on announcement surprises, in-
cluding an interaction dummy for each year in our sample. Because we have found that after 2007,
those interaction terms become signicantly positive, also taking into account the constraint due to
data availability, we have decided to consider only the e¤ect before and during the crisis. We have
analyzed the Libor and the Volatility index to identify the exact starting point of the crisis. Both
measures indicate in the beginning of August 2007 as the period in which the market realized that
the U.S. economy rst and then the world as a whole were going towards a deep recession11 .
4.1 Housing Market News
Table 5 displays the estimation results for the four securities: two-year notes, ve-year notes, ten-
year notes and thirty-year bonds. For each instrument, the rst column presents the results of an
ARCH estimation of the Mortgage Application surprises controlling for the level of the interest
rates. The second column includes a dummy variable equal to 1 after the August 1, 2007, and an
interaction term between the dummy and the market surprises regarding Mortgage Applications.
Note that Mortgage Application announcements are not release contemporaneously with others
economic gures.
[Insert Table 5, about here]
While in the rst specication the e¤ect is signicant only on the two-year note, including the
e¤ect of the crisis makes the coe¢ cient on the surprises signicant at the 1 percent level for all
the maturities. The coe¢ cients are positive, suggesting that a surprise in the number of mortgage
applications positively impact the change in interest rates. They are also of the same magnitude
across maturities. The coe¢ cient on the surprise, except for the two year note, becomes positive
only after the inclusion of the crisis. This signals that the response of the interest rates to these
announcements has changed during the crisis, as suggested by the signicance of the time dummy.
The interaction term, however, is not signicant, suggesting that after controlling for the crisis, the
Mortgage Application has a signicant e¤ect but not a di¤erential e¤ect during the crisis. This
may also be due to the availability of the data for this indicator, which is restricted to 2006-2009.
Furthermore, we further investigate the importance of the housing market considering the impact
of the Case-Shiller index12 on the interest rates.
11We have estimated our regressions with di¤erent starting points for our crisis dummy, ranging from the March
2007, the bailout of Bear Sterns, to the end of 2007, obtaining the same results.
12The S&P Case-Shiller Home Prices Index measures the residential housing market, tracking changes in the
value of the residential real estate market in 20 metropolitan regions across the United States. Due to the lack of
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[Insert Table 5B, about here]
Table 5B shows that the announcement of this home price index signicantly a¤ect the high end of
the yield curve and its e¤ect is increased during the crisis. Moreover, as suggested by the opposite
signs on the coe¢ cients for the ten and the thirty year bonds, we nd that the announcement of
this index makes the yield curve steeper.
4.2 Labor Market News
Table 6 presents the results of estimating the e¤ect of Unemployment Rate surprises on the same
four indicators. We have included in the regression the contemporaneous Jobless Claims and Non
Farm Payroll announcements. Table 6 shows the coe¢ cients only for the Unemployment Rate,
because it is the indicator that has a di¤erential e¤ect during the crisis. In fact, in this case while
the impact of surprises about the unemployment rate is not signicant over the whole period, the
interaction term between the crisis and the surprises is economically and statistically signicant
across all maturities except for the ve-year notes.
[Insert Table 6, about here]
The coe¢ cients are positive across maturities and signicant at the 5 percent level. Thus, a
surprise about the unemployment rate induces during the crisisa positive variation in the interest
rates. Of greater relevance to the current paper, is the support that these results provide to H2,
that is, that during the crisis unexpected information on labor markets has become more relevant
in predicting changes in the interest rates.
4.3 Consumption News
Table 7 shows the estimation results for the same four securities but considering the e¤ects of
Durable Goods Orders and Retail Sales on them. Panel A shows that while the e¤ect of unantici-
pated information about Durable Goods Orders on the whole sample is averaged out and becomes
insignicant, the e¤ect of these surprises during the crisis is stronger and signicant across all the
four securities.
[Insert Table 7, about here]
The coe¢ cient is signicant at the 1 percent condence level, on the higher end of the yield
curve. While the e¤ect is always positive, its magnitude increases with maturity. This is consistent
with the interpretations of market participants of these gures in terms of ination expectations.
forecasts for this index we consider just the announcement e¤ect on the interest rates. We have considered only the
observations for which it is the only economic announcement.
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Panel B shows the results for the Retail Sales, showing that there exists a signicant e¤ect if
and only if we control for the crisis, but the interaction term is signicant only on the ve-year note.
This suggests that the response of the yield curve changed over time, becoming more responsive to
these news.
4.4 News from the Fed
We now turn to the announcements directly made by the Fed. First, Table 8 shows the results of
model (2) considering the e¤ect of an auction announcement on the changes in the interest rates.
The Auction E¤ect is dened as the change in the ratio between the total amount accepted and the
total amount tendered for each auction announcement. These are the sum of all bids accepted and
of all bids o¤ered, respectively. This means that the value of our auction e¤ect ranges from zero
to one, with a value close to one representing an auction in which the supply is extremely high or
the demand is extremely low. We consider the variation in this ratio as dependent variable to take
into account the possibility that the Fed may have injected too much liquidity into the market and
then may be forced to o¤er a higher interest rate to induce the market to absorb it. This may be
due to two main reasons. First, record debt sales, as the government responds to the recession and
surging budget decits, has "created signicant indigestion and uncertainty for Treasury investors"
and rising investor uncertainty "ultimately would mean greater cost" to the government13 . Second,
for the rst time since 1960, when it created the network of securities rms obligated to buy and
sell Treasury bonds, the U.S. government has the fewest bond traders making markets in its debt.
In fact, the number of primary government securities dealers declined to 19 in August 2008. This
means that the competition among these bidders declined during the crisis, that is, when American
taxpayers were nancing a record federal decit.
Panel A nds supportive evidence that auction announcements are important in understanding
the variations in the interest rates during the crisis.
[Insert Table 8, about here]
The coe¢ cients are signicant at the 5 percent condence level for the two-year, ve-year and
thirty-year securities. They are positive at the short end of the yield curve and negative at the long
end. This suggests, as stated in hypothesis H4, that not only auction announcements have gained
much attention from the market during the crisis, but that injecting a record amount of treasuries
in the market has increased the cost (higher yields) of the federal decit for the U.S. government.
The negative e¤ect on the thirty year bond is due to the Fed repurchasing long maturity bonds, for
almost a $300 billion amount, to keep mortgage rates low. The announcements of these purchases
are usually contemporaneous to the auction announcements.
13See "Auction Tails Suggest Record Treasury Sales May Boost Yields", February 4, 2009 Bloomberg News.
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Having highlighted the role played by the record U.S. government debt, we further investigate
this issue analyzing surprises about the Federal Decit. Panel B presents the e¤ect of this gure
usually disregarded by market participants. The slope coe¢ cients are signicant during the crisis at
the short and long ends of the yield curve, with opposite signs, suggesting that surprises about the
Federal Decit during the crisis have inuenced the markets expectations about ination, making
the curve steeper.
The evidence reported in Tables 4 - 8 suggests two main considerations14 . First, if we restrict
attention to the average e¤ect of economic news on the yield curve, very few information releases
turn out to be signicant, while if we try to disentangle the e¤ect that these gures had before and
during the crisis, we nd that new economic announcements have gained importance. Second, the
impact of this information is time varying, that is, their explanatory power is not the same over
time. The importance of the housing and labor markets, for example, has sharply increased during
the crisis. This constitutes supportive evidence for H1, H2 and H3.
5 Main Results
We now turn to the main question, motivated by the previous ndings, that is, is the FED under
political pressure during the crisis, or to put it di¤erently, does the yield curve di¤erent response
to economics announcements during the crisis signals the presence of political constraints on the
Federal Reserve?
To investigate this issue we start analyzing the di¤erential impact of economic news on the level
and on the slope of the yield curve. Table 9 presents the estimation results. Panel A shows the
impact of news that are relevant for the level of interest rates. These announcements are Jobless
Claims, Average Hourly Earnings, Weekly Hours, Personal Consumption, Personal Income, Number
of Permits and Mortgage Applications15 .
[Insert Table 9, about here]
The ARCH model is augmented to include, as discussed above, an interaction term between the
single announcements and the crisis. It provides strong evidence that the yield curve is signicantly
a¤ected by these economic news announcements and that these e¤ects are signicant only during
the crisis16 . Both the news about the labor markets and those about the housing market are
14We have estimated the same regressions using a SUR estimation procedure, without obtaining any di¤erent
result.
15We estimate the coe¢ cients for the contemporaneous variables in the same regression, obtaining the same
results. Regressing each announcement separately gives us a clear representation of the di¤erential e¤ect of these
announcements before and after the crisis. Including the contemporaneous variables in the same regression, although
does not a¤ect the signicance of the estimated coe¢ cients, increases the standard errors and does not allow us, due
to the number of observation, to include an interaction term for each variable.
16We have performed the same analysis on di¤erent subsamples, for the surprises for which we have the data,
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statistically and economically signicant during the crisis. This, together with the evidence reported
in the previous section, suggests that to explain the level of interest rates after the economic
meltdown it is important to look at these information releases. Pro-cyclical variables such as
Personal Consumption, Personal Income and Mortgage Applications have indeed a negative e¤ect
on the level of the yield curve.
We then turn to the impact of economic news on the slope of the yield curve. Panel B re-
ports the e¤ects of the relevant economic announcements in explaining variations in the slope of
the yield curve. These surprises are Jobless Claims, Non-Farm Payroll, GDP, Personal Income,
Durable Goods Orders, Mortgage Applications, New Housing Starts, Existing Home Sales and
Federal Decit. Note that the labor market information and the income related announcements
have a signicant impact only during the crisis, while the information about the housing market
is signicant directly through the gure announcements, without considering the interaction term.
This is also due to the fact that the news about the housing market start changing sign during the
crisis. The Existing Home Sales, for example, has been above the economistsforecasts throughout
2004-2007 period. It started to negatively surprise the market in June 2008, suggesting that only
at that time that announcement started having a signicant e¤ect on the yield curve. We now turn
to this asymmetry in market reactions.
Up to this point we have simply considered the set of all surprises, without di¤erentiating be-
tween good and bad news. We turn to this issue now, estimating the e¤ect of selected gures on the
level and slope of the yield curve while di¤erentiating between positive and negative surprises and
whether or not those correspond to encouraging news about the economy. The announcements con-
sidered are those considered in the previous regressions, but only the signicant ones are presented
in Table 10.
[Insert Table 10, about here]
Panel A, which considers the e¤ects on the level of the yield curve, provides strong evidence
to support H3, that is, that there is a signicant asymmetry in the way interest rates respond to
good and bad news. Consider, for example, the e¤ect of Jobless Claims. Before the crisis, this
variable is signicant only if it represents good news, whereas, during the crisis it is signicant only
if it represents worsening labor market conditions. The same pattern is identied for all the labor
releases, such as the Average Hourly Wages and Weekly Hours. The number of Housing Starts
inuences the yield curve only if it is a positive surprise during the crisis, suggesting that it is more
informative during the crisis to have good news about the housing market than bad news, which are
probably already incorporated in the markets expectations. The Number of Permits, in contrast,
has a signicant e¤ect only before the crisis when it indicated bad news, suggesting that this index
obtaining the same results. This shows that the results are not due to the higher variability of the regressors during
the crisis.
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always performed better than the economistsforecasts before the crisis, and thereafter only a sharp
decrease could cause a signicant reaction in the interest rates. T-tests for the di¤erence in the
coe¢ cients of each economic announcement between good and bad news reject the null hypothesis
at the 1 percent condence level for all the variables.
Panel B presents the estimated coe¢ cients of the economic news that signicantly a¤ect the
slope of the yield curve. The rst thing to notice is that the dummy that accounts for the crisis is
more signicant here than in the level case, consistent with the evidence that during the crisis we are
facing the steepest yield curve in the U.S. history. All the economic news, with the only exception
of Jobless Claims, have a signicantly greater impact on the yield curve when they represent bad
news about the underlying economic fundamentals.
In summary, we have found evidence that supports the hypotheses about the attention gained
by housing and labor markets during the crisis, the time varying e¤ects of these announcements on
the yield curve and the asymmetry between the responses of the interest rates to good versus bad
news.
5.1 Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence Estimator
This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the Fed has changed its policy reaction function
during the crisis; however, we are still not able to assess the relative likelihood of the fragility versus
the political pressure hypotheses. To address this issue, we turn to a cross-sectional di¤erence
response of the yield curve to economic news. That is, we collect data about Euro swap rates and
economic gures and forecasts related to the labor market and try to estimate the impact of these
indicators. The results are presented as references in Table 11.
[Insert Table 11, about here]
It shows that the economic gures we have collected are relevant to explain the daily varia-
tions in the Euro swap rates17 . Moreover, we can observe a similar time varying pattern as the
one highlighted for the U.S.. Unemployment Rate, for example, has a signicant impact only on
the slope of the yield curve and the interaction term which accounts for the di¤erential e¤ect of
unemployment surprises during the crisis is signicant at 1 percent condence level. GDP and IFO
Business Climate have a signicant e¤ect on both the level and the slope of the yield curve, while
surprises about Retail Sales impact only the yield curve slope.
Up to now we have very strong evidence that the crisis has changed the way market participants
and then interest rates react to economic news. However, we have not explained the driven forces
of these new e¤ects. In fact, this evidence is not su¢ cient to disentangle the fragility hypothesis
from the political pressure hypothesis. Assuming that the political pressure has indeed been exerted
17We use U.S. swap rates instead of treasuries to be consistent with the data available for Europe.
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by the Congress during the crisis, there should be a systematic di¤erence in market participants
beliefs, and thus, in the way interest rates respond to macro announcements, between the U.S. with
and without political constraints. We have investigated the time dimension of our dataset, but
because the political constraints coincide with the starting of the crisis we cannot disentangle the
two hypothesis looking just at the time varying markets beliefs. We need a control group.
We have chosen Europe as the control group for three main reasons. First, Europe has expe-
rienced the same deep recession as the one that has hit the U.S. For example, in Europe the level
of unemployment rate spiked to a 10-year high in May 2009 with more than 15 million people out
of work. Moreover, even the European banking sector experienced similar dissiculties to the U.S.,
in fact, the International Monetary Fund estimated that large U.S. and European banksexpected
losses will reach $1 trillion in the U.S. and $1.6 trillion in Europe by the end of 2010. Then, a
di¤erent magnitude of e¤ects during the crisis between the two currency areas cannot be to larger
magnitude of shock in one of them.
Second, there is usually a high degree of correlation between central banks policy reaction func-
tions, which means that they should react almost uniformly to information releases18 . However, to
account for di¤erences in the policy reaction functions we add xed e¤ect to our main specication,
in order to take that e¤ect into account.
Third, and most importantly, given the low inuence of each member and the heterogeneity of
interests in the European Union, the ECB has not experienced any political pressure during the
crisis to change the interest rates19 . There exists also a signicant di¤erence in the Statute of the
ECB with respect to the Feds, which makes the former less accountable. In fact, based on the
Maastricht Treaty, neither ECB nor any member of decision-making bodies are allowed to seek or
to take instruction from community institution, while the Fed is ultimately countable to Congress
and come under government audit and review.
[Insert Table 12, about here]
We employ a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach to estimate the di¤erent response of the level and
the slope of interest rates in the two monetary zones, controlling also for any xed e¤ects that could
determine the di¤erent response of the European monetary policy from that of the U.S.. That is,
we estimate the following model:
y = 1Crisis+ 2Unemp+ 3Country + 4X + 5Crisis  Unemp  Country + " (4)
where we have omitted the time subscript. The dependent variable is the level and the slope of the
18The existing literature usually assumes that the policy reaction function is a version of the Taylor Rule. Then,
the way in which the central banks respond to macroeconomic announcements is very similar.
19See Maier et al. (2002) for evidence supporting this hypothesis.
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yield curves.
The rst three terms account for the di¤erent xed e¤ects: a time xed e¤ect, an unemployment
xed e¤ect and a country xed e¤ect. The rst takes into account aggregate factors that may have
changed in Europe and U.S. as a consequence of the crisis. Although we have argued that the crisis
had the same impact on both areas, the inclusion of this term allows us to capture all the factors
that we cannot explicitly consider.
The second variable captures the di¤erences in the the two central banksresponse functions and
how responsive they are to news about the economic conditions. In principle, the ECB may decide
to react less to certain macroeconomic announcements because it aims to implement a di¤erent
monetary policy.
The third xed e¤ect aims to capture all the others aggregate factors, for example the di¤erent
market conditions or the heterogeneity in the policy makers expectations about the economic
fundamentals. The inclusion of these xed e¤ects and of all the interaction terms in X is essential
to take into account the aggregate factors that may lead to a di¤erent response to economic news
in the two currency areas.
The focus of our analysis is on the the coe¢ cient 5; which is our di¤-in-di¤ coe¢ cient. Table 12
highlights two main ndings. First, all the xed e¤ects are economically and statistically signicant.
This means that it was important to take those into account for the validity of our conclusions.
Second, the estimated coe¢ cient 5 is signicant at 5 percent level for the regression of the slope,
meaning that there exists a signicant di¤erence in the way the market believes the rates will change
in U.S. with respect to the Europe.
To further test this hypothesis we estimate the same regression as in (4) but considering the
di¤erential impact to GDP announcements. The third and fourth columns of Table 12 show that
both the level and the slope of the yield curve react di¤erently to economic news about the GDP.
In summary, we nd strong evidence in favor of the political pressure hypothesis exploiting
the cross-sectional dimension of our data. The signicance of the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimator
between the U.S. and the Europe suggests that, according to the market, something else other than
the crisis and the economic conditions explains the di¤erence between the reaction of interest rates
to economic news. Given the anecdotal evidence presented in the introduction, we believe that it
is capturing the presence of political constraints on the Federal Reserve.
6 Extension: Future Funds Rate as Measure of Future Pol-
icy
We have considered the markets beliefs about what the Fed will do as the response of the yield
curve to economic news. However, there exists an accurate measure of the Feds policy decisions,
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the future funds rate. Now we aim to consider this as an alternative approach to estimate the time
varying markets beliefs about the Feds policy function.
Up to this point, we have tried to measure the markets expectations about the policy changes
with the response of the yield curve to economic news. However, many analysts look to the federal
funds futures market for an indication of whether the market anticipates a change in Fed policy.
The Chicago board of Trade began o¤ering federal funds future contracts in October 1988. The
future contract is for the simply average of the daily e¤ective federal funds rate during the month
of the contract. Their settlement price is equal to 100 minus the average of the e¤ective feral funds
rate for the month of the contract. Hence, a market price of 94.3 for a one-month contract means
that the current futures rate for the next month is 5.7 percent. Because market participants make
commitments that are contingent on what they believe the federal funds rate will be, they necessarily
look to factors they believe will inuence its course. Hence, the federal funds future rate naturally
embodies the markets expectation of what the Fed will do. As suggested by Hamilton (2008) the
Federal Reserves expected future policy rate inuences current interest rates immediately upon the
market learning about the Federal Reserves intentions to stimulate or curtail economic behavior.
Table 13 shows the e¤ect of selected economic announcements on the daily changes in the
future fund rate. We consider the Jobless Claims, Average Hourly Earnings, Non Farm Payroll and
Unemployment Rate in the rst two columns. We control for the lagged target rate. We nd that all
the interaction terms between the labor market surprises and the crisis are statistically signicant,
except for Non Farm Payroll. This is consistent with the evidence reported above, in fact, it
shows that there has been a signicant change in markets beliefs about the changes in monetary
policy. All the coe¢ cients are negative suggesting a decrease in the interest rates as a response to
worsening labor market conditions. We then consider also the impact of Mortgage Applications,
Housing Starts and Existing Home Sales. The results are highly signicant both statistically and
economically, which establishes that the markets beliefs about the Federal Reserves response to
housing market fundamentals has changed during the crisis. Controlling for the lagged target rate
makes sure that these e¤ects are not due to the current low interest rates.
7 Conclusion
This paper takes advantage of both a time-varying di¤erential e¤ect of economic news and of their
di¤erent impact on the U.S. with respect to the Euro zone to provide evidence that during the crisis
there has been a successful attempt by the Congress to inuence the Feds monetary policy.
We have rst shown that housing and labor market gures, together with Treasury auction
announcements, have gained most of the market participantsattention during the crisis. Further-
more, these gures have di¤erent impacts over time on the interest rates, conrming that during
the crisis they are being more closely monitored. Then, we have shown that there is an asymmetry
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in the response of the interest rates, as proxied by the rst two PCA factors, to good and bad news
over time. This shows that not only the response to economic news has changed, but that the whole
Feds policy response function has been modied.
To support this evidence and to disentangle the political pressure hypothesis from a Feds genuine
attempt to respond to the changed economic conditions, we employ as control group the European
interest rates. We nd that there exists a signicant di¤erence in the change in level and slope of
the yield curve during the crisis as a response to economic news. We interpret this as evidence that
the Fed has been politically constrained.
We augment the nding that the crisis has signicantly changed the way the markets beliefs
respond to release of unexpected information with an analysis of Future Funds rate, which shows,
consistently to the previous results, that markets expectations about the Feds future policy has
been signicantly a¤ected during the crisis.
We also want to highlight an important avenue for future research20 . We have not disentangled
political pressure from the accountability of the Fed to the Congress. We called this e¤ect political
pressure, as suggested by the attempt to put the Federal Reserves operations under the supervi-
sion of the Congress and by some of the clear although just anecdotal evidence discussed in the
introduction. Yet, this e¤ect may be interpreted as an accountability e¤ect, that is, an attempt
by the Congress to prevent the Fed from being captured by Wall Street bankers. Evidence on this
issue would shed important light on this topic.
20We thank Daron Acemoglu for this suggestion.
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